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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Plaintiffs (the "Grappendorfs") are appealing orders of dismissal pursuant 
to Pleasant Grove City's (the "City" or "Pleasant Grove") Motion for Summary Judgment 
issued by the district court on March 29, 2005, and May 17, 2005. (Record on Appeal 
["R."] at 1034-1056, and 1063-1069). Pursuant to a May 19, 2006 Order, the appeal was 
transferred by the Utah Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). However, at the request of the City of Pleasant Grove ("Pleasant 
Grove" or the "City") this Court retained this case pursuant to a June 14, 2006 Order. 
Thus, this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2. 
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APPELLATE ISSUES 
A. Given the Undisputed Facts of this Case as Found Applicable by the Trial Court, 
Did the Trial Court Err in Granting the City's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Pursuant to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act's Natural Condition Exception? 
B. Did the Governmental Immunity Act, as Applied to the Grappendorfs, Violate the 
Open Courts Clause of the Utah Constitution? 
C. Did the Governmental Immunity Act, as Applied, Violate the Grappendorfs' Right 
under the Utah Constitution to Recover Damages for Injuries Resulting in Death? 
D. Did the Governmental Immunity Act, as Applied, Violate the Grappendorfs' 
Petition Rights under the Utah Constitution. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Pleasant Grove is a municipality in Utah and owns and operates a recreation 
venue called "Discovery Park Baseball Diamonds" or "Manila Field." [R. at 1053]. "To 
accommodate baseball and softball game play, Pleasant Grove purchased and used a 
moveable pitching mound." Id. "This mound had been chained to a fence by a Pleasant 
Grove employee, and, in June of 2002 a forceful wind gust [a microburst] lifted the 
mound, causing it to strike Daniel A. Grappendorf who sustained fatal injuries." Id. 
On September 18, 2003 the Grappendorfs engaged in their constitutionally 
protected right to petition for redress of their grievances by filing the instant action 
against Pleasant Grove among others. Brief of the Appellant at page 6-7. Pleasant Grove 
moved for summary judgment from suit based on the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
(the "Act"), specifically the natural condition exception and the infliction of mental 
anguish exception to general waivers of governmental immunity. After standard briefing, 
and supplemental briefing, on February 28, 2005 the trial court heard oral argument. On 
March 29, 2005 the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision granting Pleasant Grove's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. [R. at 1034-1056], The trial court held that "under the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act as in effect in 2002, Defendant Pleasant Grove City is 
entitled to immunity from suit for negligence in this case because, by operation of U.C.A. 
§ 63-30-10(11) [the natural condition exception to waiver of governmental immunity], the 
city's immunity from negligence is not waived." [R. at 1045-46]. 
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Addressing the Grappendorfs' claim that the Act was unconstitutional as 
applied to them the trial court held that: "this court cannot find that the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act as amended in 1987 unconstitutionally abrogated a pre-
existing and constitutionally protected cause of action for negligence against a 
municipality or its employee in the operation or maintenance of a public park." [R. at 
1036]. "Because there is no finding that the legislature impermissibly abrogated a cause 
of action,... the immunity statute must be applied . . . . " Id. 
In a Supplemental Memorandum Decision [R. at 1063-1069], the trial court 
further held that in regards to the initial Memorandum Decision: "In short, Pleasant 
Grove's operation and maintenance of Manila Field is a governmental function within the 
meaning of the Act, and the Act specifically waives immunity from suit for the 
negligence of Pleasant Grove." [R. at 1067]. Further, the trial court held that "the 
statutory language [of the Act] specifically retains immunity for negligence-based claims 
for emotional distress." Id. "Therefore, under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 
U.C.A. § 63-30-1 et seq., as in effect in 2002, Pleasant Grove is immune from suit by 
Plaintiffs' for their claims for emotional distress." Id. at 1065. After settlement or 
dismissal removed any remaining defendants from the instant case, the Grappendorfs 
brought this appeal. 
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Pleasant Grove is a city in Utah, which owns and operates a recreational 
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city park and ball field complex called "Discovery Park Baseball Diamonds" or "Manila 
Field." See Brief of Appellant; [R. 0346, 1053]. 
2. To accommodate both baseball and Softball play at the Manila Fields,1 
Pleasant Grove purchased and used a moveable pitching mound made of plywood and 
covered with artificial turf. Brief of Appellant at page 9. 
3. At the time of the relevant microburst wind event this mound had been 
chained to a fence by a Pleasant Grove employee. [R. 1053]. 
4. The pitching mound was chained to the fence by circling the chain through 
a nylon strap or handle on the pitching mound. [R. at 258-59]. The nylon strap was 
connected to the top edge of the pitching mound by four one-inch screws. Brief of 
Appellant at page 9. 
5. The sole purpose for chaining the mound to the fence was to "keep 
'somebody from being injured while jumping bikes.'" [R. at 1046 (marks omitted)]. 
6. On June 21, 2002, thirteen-year-old Daniel Grappendorf went to watch his 
sister play softball at Manila Field. Brief of Appellant at page 9. 
7. At approximately 7:55 p.m., an unexpected and violent summer microburst 
wind gust lifted the mound up and pulled it away from the chain-link fence, breaking the 
nylon strap and causing the mound to move through the air. See Brief of Appellant at 
page 9; [R. at 239, 242, 257, 512 (Appellants' counsel's admission that gust of wind was 
1
 Softball is played without an elevated pitching mound. 
-5-
amicroburst)]. 
8. Propelled by the microburst gust of wind, the pitching mound struck and 
killed Daniel Grappendorf. Brief of Appellant at page 9; [R. at 1053]. 
9. The trial court granted Pleasant Grove's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
finding that the microburst gust of wind was the cause of Daniel Grappendorfs death, 
thereby finding the undisputed facts of the case to fall within the "natural condition" 
exception to the Governmental Immunity Act, and finding that the Act was constitutional 
as applied to the Grappendorfs in light of Article I § 11 (Open Courts Clause) and Article 
XVI § 5 (Wrongful Death Guarantee) of the Utah Constitution. Brief of Appellant at 
page 10. 
10. On February 28, 2005 the trial court heard brief oral argument regarding the 
Grappendorfs' claim that the Act was unconstitutional as applied to them because it 
violated their rights under Article I § 1, (Petition Clause) of the Utah Constitution. [R. at 
1150 pages 13 and 29]. The trial court did not address the issue in the Memorandum 
Decision. Brief of Appellant at page 10. However, the trial court stated at oral argument 
with regards to the Petition Clause claim: "you can sue everybody" and "[t]haf s why I 
come to work everyday." [R. at 1150 pages 13 and 29]. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court correctly applied the Utah Governmental Immunity Act's 
"natural condition" exception to waiver of immunity to the undisputed facts of this case. 
The Utah Supreme Court held in Blackner v. State, DepL of Tramp,, 48 P.3d 949, 2002 
UT 44, that when a plaintiffs injury "arises out o f or in connection with, or results from 
a natural condition on publically owned or controlled lands, governmental immunity is 
retained with respect to any action to recover for injuries proximately caused by a 
government employee's negligence. The "arises out o f language requires only that there 
be some causal nexus between the risk of the natural condition and the resulting injury. 
M a t ^15. 
Here, the risk that the pitching mound at the publically owned and operated 
Manila field would become airborne and strike and kill Daniel Grappendorf "arose out 
o f the natural condition of the microburst of wind. "But for" the natural condition of the 
microburst gust of wind the pitching mound would have absolutely remained on the 
ground. Accordingly, the City is immune from suit on these undisputed facts. 
This application of the Act does not violate the Open Courts Clause of the 
Utah Constitution. Furthermore, there are no other constitutional infirmities with Judge 
Taylor's application of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, nor its application in this 
case. Judge Taylor's application of the Act in this case does not violate the wrongful 
death cause of action guarantee of the Utah Constitution. The Utah Governmental 
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Immunity Act allows immunity from suit for all government entities for any injury which 
results from the exercise of a government function. The Grappendorfs claim that the 
definition of government function is overbroad and bars them from the courts, even 
though the Grappendorfs have successfully settled this lawsuit as to at least one 
defendant. Here, the municipal operation of a non-proprietary baseball/softball complex 
and city park is entirely a government function. At no time in the history of Utah law 
would the law and its application have been any different to these undisputed facts. 
Given Judge Taylor's thorough and correct application of the Act, the Grappendorfs have 
suffered no violation of the Open Courts Clause of the Utah Constitution. 
Finally, Judge Taylor's application of the Act in this case does not violate 
the Petition Clause. The Grappendorfs filed this civil case and have petitioned the court 
for grievances. This is evidenced by the fact that the Appellants now have this case on 
appeal. The right to petition the courts does not amount to the right to an absolute 
outcome. The right to petition the courts as guaranteed in the Utah Constitution 
guarantees only the absolute right to file a complaint, which the Grappendorfs have done. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. Standard of Appellate Review, 
The appropriate standards of appellate review applicable in this case were 
stated precisely by this Court in Blackner v. State, Dept ofTransp., 48 P.3d 949, 2002 
UT 44. In Blackner, this Court held that: 
Summary judgment is proper only if there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law. When reviewing whether the trial court properly granted summary 
judgment, we accord the trial court's legal conclusions no deference and 
review those conclusions for correctness. Furthermore, a trial court's 
interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review for 
correctness. 
Id. at J^ 8 (internal marks and citations omitted). 
II. The Appellants' Factual Assertions on Appeal are not Supported by the 
Record nor by Competent Evidence. 
In the Grappendorfs' Statements of Fact they make a number of factual 
assertions which are unsupported by record evidence or admissible evidence. 
For example, the Grappendorfs claim that storing the mound on its side was 
"contrary to the manufacturer's express, written safety instructions, which required the 
pitching mound to be stored flat on the floor or on its side 'flush against a wall.'" Brief of 
Appellant at page 9. There is no factual evidence in the record which indicates that 
Pleasant Grove stored the mound "contrary to the manufacturer's express, written safety 
instructions." In fact, there were no "safety instructions" with the mound. The record 
does indicate that the mound had storage instructions to avoid warping of the mound and 
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ensuring the portable pitching mound had a longer use time. The only storage 
instructions in the record indicate that: 
Storage of all mounds is crucial to longer service time. The warranty 
becomes void if the product is not stored properly. Do not store any 
products on top of the mounds of the mound is lying flat on the ground. If 
the mounds are stored on their side, make certain they are set flush against 
the wall. Warpage will occur if other products are stacked on top of the 
mound and if the mound is not set flush against the wall. Vacuum out the 
Astro Turf before putting the mound in storage to add to service time of the 
mound. 
[R. at 388]. Clearly these storage instructions are not "safety instructions." In fact, 
Pleasant Grove was storing the mound on its side as these storage instructions indicate 
they should. Whether the mound was flush against a wall or chain link fence is of no 
moment here, as the storage instructions only indicate this should be done to avoid 
warping of the mound, not as any type of safety precaution. 
Also, the Grappendorfs cite to inadmissible evidence which they attached as 
an exhibit to their Response in Opposition to Pleasant Grove's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The trial court indicated these exhibits were improper and did not consider 
this evidence. In footnote 25 of the Memorandum Decision the trial court states: 
Exhibit 2 is not an affidavit of Paul Schoonover and is replete with 
inadmissible hearsay. . . . This exhibit, filed without foundation, may not be 
considered by this court in any event. U.R.C.P. 12 allows the court to 
consider "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits...." This and the Plaintiffs similar 
exhibits appear to be transcripts of telephone conversations and are not any 
of those items listed in Rule 12. 
[R. at 1046]. The Appellants' Brief repeatedly cites to the inadmissible evidence which 
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the trial court did not use, as it is not allowed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See 
Brief of Appellants at page 9, f 3 (citing to Exhibit 2, Paul Schoonover Memo), and ^ 4 
(citing to Detective Thornton Memo). This Court cannot consider these inadmissible 
documents.2 
The Grappendorfs now cite to these exhibits, and other non-existent facts, 
as if they are properly in the record. See e.g., Brief of Appellant at page 9, ^ 3 (safety 
instructions), f 4 (not to secure the pitching mound to a fence), and f^ 8 (decapitated). 
References to facts which do not exist in the record, or are improperly in the record, 
should not be considered by this Court. 
III. Judge Taylor Correctly Applied the Utah Governmental Immunity Act's 
Natural Condition Exception to the Undisputed Facts of this Case. 
"[T]o determine whether a governmental entity is immune from suit under 
the Act, we apply a three-part test, which assesses (1) whether the activity undertaken is a 
governmental function; (2) whether governmental immunity was waived for the particular 
activity; and (3) whether there is an exception to that waiver." Blackner, 2002 UT 44 at f 
10. 
2Although these facts are unsupportable, even if they were record evidence and 
were considered by this Court to constitute negligent storage, it would not matter as the 
trial court correctly found at footnote 4 of the Memorandum Decision, under the express 
exceptions to waivers of governmental immunity that are applicable to this case, "the 
court may assume that Pleasant Grove was negligent." [R. at 1053]. 
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A, Government Function. 
The Act defines a 'governmental function' as: 
'Governmental function' means any act, failure to act, operation, function, 
or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or not the act, failure to 
act, operation, function, or undertaking is characterized as governmental, 
proprietary, a core governmental function, unique to government, 
undertaken in a dual capacity, essential to or not essential to a government 
or governmental function, or could be performed by private enterprise or 
private persons. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4)(a). Utah Courts have interpreted this definition broadly. 
Laney v Fairview City, 2002 UT 79,14, 57 P.3d 1007, 1011 (Utah 2002) (holding that 
the term governmental function is broadly defined in section 63-30-2(4)(a), and by virtue 
of that broad definition, the statute cloaks governmental entities with immunity for a wide 
range of activities.). 
While the Grappendorfs now dispute on appeal whether the maintenance of 
the Manila Fields by Pleasant Grove is a government function, the trial court properly 
stated the Grappendorfs' position in the record when it stated that: "It is undisputed that 
Pleasant Grove is a city and that the maintenance and operation of Manila Field is a 
'government function'.. . ." [R. at 1051]. Further, the Grappendorfs only dispute whether 
Pleasant Grove is engaging in a government function under the constitutional analysis 
which is addressed below. The Grappendorfs leave any discussion of whether Pleasant 
Grove is engaged in a government function out of their analysis of whether the natural 
condition exception to a waiver of governmeni immunity applies. This is likely because 
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of the sweeping language in the definition of "government function" of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act in effect in 2002 at the time of this tragic accident.3 Further, 
in their Memorandum in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, the City 
affirmatively stated that: "The City owns and operates the Discovery Park Baseball 
Diamonds (the "Diamonds") which are sometimes referred to as Manila Field." [R. at 
0259], The Grappendorfs did not dispute this fact at all. [R. at 0515 (stating that 
"Plaintiffs do not generally disagree with any of Defendants facts[.]")]. Simply, it cannot 
be disputed that Pleasant Grove's maintenance of the Manila Fields was anything other 
than a government function. 
B. Waiver of Immunity. 
The trial court assumed Pleasant Grove was negligent.4 If Pleasant Grove 
were negligent in their storage of the pitching mound, immunity from suit would be 
waived under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10. 
C. Exception to Immunity Waiver. 
The Grappendorfs allege on appeal that the trial court erred in determining 
3
 Effective July 1, 2004, the relevant provision of the Act was reenacted as Utah 
Code § 63-30d-301. However, "[i]t is the intent of the legislature that: (1) injuries alleged 
to be caused by a governmental entity that occurred before July 1, 2004 be governed by 
the provisions of Title 63, Chapter 30 . . .". Section 48 of Laws 2004, c. 267. Thus, Title 
63, Chapter 30 is cited in this memorandum. 
4Pleasant Grove would submit that the clear and undisputed facts of this case 
indicate that they were not negligent in their storage of the pitching mound. However, as 
discussed herein, this Court need not decide the negligence issue to dispose of this case 
because as the trial court did, even where negligence is assumed, immunity applies. 
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that the natural condition exception to the waiver of immunity applied to the undisputed 
facts. The Act provides an exception to the waiver of governmental immunity where the 
Grappendorfs' alleged injury either "arises out of, in connection with, or results from:... 
(11) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands " Utah Code Ann. § 
63-30-10(11); see Blackner, 2002 UT 44, «[j 11. This language evidences the clear intent 
of the legislature of the State of Utah. 
The Blackner court explained that: 
When interpreting statutes, we determine the statute's meaning by first 
looking to the statute's plain language, and give effect to the plain language 
unless the language is ambiguous. The statute's language plainly states that 
all governmental entities are immune from suit for a government 
employee's negligence when the plaintiffs injury arose from, was 
connected with, or resulted from a "natural condition on publicly owned or 
controlled lands." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(11) (1997). 
Id. at |^ 12 (citations omitted).5 
5
 A thorough recitation of this Court's review of the Utah Government Immunity 
Act's exceptions to waiver of government immunity is provided in Lyon v. Burton, 5 P.3d 
616, 622, 2000 UT 19 \ 17, where this Court slates: 
In construing these subsections, we apply long-standing rules of statutory 
construction. This court's primary objective in construing enactments is to 
give effect to the legislature's intent. The plain language of a statute is 
generally the best indication of that intent. Therefore, where the statutory 
language is plain and unambiguous, we do not look beyond the language's 
plain meaning to divine legislative intent. The plain language of a statute is 
to be read as a whole, and its provisions interpreted in harmony with other 
provisions in the same statute and with other statutes under the same and 
related chapters. Furthermore, where possible we construe statutory 
provisions so as to give full effect to all their terms. Most pertinent here is 
the rule that a statute dealing specifically with a particular issue prevails 
over a more general statute that arguably also deals with the same issue. 
Id. (internal marks, citations, and quotations omitted). 
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In Blackner, Mr. Blackner was on his way up Little Cottonwood Canyon 
when he was stopped in a known avalanche area because crews were removing snow off 
the road from a prior avalanche. Id. at J^ 4. While Mr. Blackner was stopped in the 
known avalanche area, another avalanche came down the mountain and injured Mr. 
Blackner. Id. at \ 6. Mr. Blackner sued the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) 
and Alta City, alleging that their negligence in managing the first avalanche and stopping 
him in a known avalanche area resulted in his injuries. Id. at % 7. The only issue decided 
by the Utah Supreme Court in Blackner was whether the "natural condition" exception 
shielded UDOT and Alta City from liability for the alleged negligent acts or omissions of 
governmental employees. Id. at f^ 10. 
Similar to Blackner, the Grappendorfs claim on appeal that it was the 
negligence of Pleasant Grove that was the proximate cause of their injuries and the death 
of Daniel Grappendorf. For example, the Grappendorfs claim that "but for" the 
negligence of Pleasant Grove the microburst wind gust "would not have caused the 
pitching mound to become airborne nor would the pitching mound have caused Daniel 
Grappendorfs death." Brief of Appellant at page 13. The Grappendorfs also claim that 
"the governmental negligence disregarding express manufacturer's instructions and 
placing an artificial pitching mound in a position that was contrary to the safe procedure 
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required by the manufacturer created the danger."6 Id. Mr. Blackner made the same 
argument when he claimed that "the negligence of UDOT and Alta was the proximate 
cause of his injuries instead of that avalanche." Blackner, 2002 UT 44 at \ 13. Just like 
this Court said in Blackner, here the Grappendorfs' argument "either miscomprehends or 
misapplies the plain language of the Act." Id. 
As the Blackner court explained, Mr. Blackner misunderstood the plain 
language of the Act, and here so have the Grappendorfs, because: 
The Act unequivocally provides that when a plaintiffs injury either arises 
out of or in connection with, or results from a natural condition on publicly 
owned or controlled lands, governmental immunity is retained with respect 
to any action to recover for injuries proximately caused by a government 
employee's negligence. The application of the "natural condition" 
exception to the waiver of governmental immunity does not hinge on 
whether the "natural condition" in any way "proximately caused" the 
plaintiffs injuries. 
In the instant case, even assuming that the actions of Payne and Medara 
were negligent and proximately caused Blackner's injuries, UDOT and Alta 
are immune from suit to recover for those injuries because Blackner's 
injuries arose out of a natural condition on publicly owned or controlled 
land. 
Id. at ffif 13-14. 
The Blackner court then goes on to explain that: 
Under the statute, the "arise out o f language requires only that there be 
some causal nexus between the risk and the resulting injury. In other 
words, but for the [natural condition], Blackner would not have suffered 
6As discussed in section I of this Brief, these arguments are simply not supported 
by the record. Nowhere in the manufacturer's storage instructions are danger or safety 
issues discussed. See [R. at 387-89]. 
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injury.... Blackner's injuries arose out of a natural condition existing on 
publicly owned or controlled land. Accordingly, the trial court correctly 
concluded that UDOT and Alta are immune from Blackner's suit because 
the "natural condition" exception to the waiver of governmental immunity 
applies to Blackner's injuries regardless of whether Payne and Medara [the 
government employees] were negligent. 
Id. at Xi 15-16. The plain language of the Act is clear, and this Court's strict 
interpretation of that plain language is also clearly and unequivocally evidenced in 
Blackner. 
Blackner is not the only case where the plain language of the Act has been 
clearly evidenced. For example in Tiede v. State, 915 P.2d 500 (Utah 1996), this Court 
held that the plain language of section 63-30-10 immunizes a government entity against a 
negligence action when the injury arises out of one of the exceptions listed in section 63-
30-10. Id. at 502. "The definition section of the Act states that "injury means death, 
among other things." Id. (citing § 63-30-2(5)) (marks omitted). "Thus a governmental 
entity is immune from a negligence action for a death arising out of an [section 63-30-10 
exception to waiver of government immunity]." Id. 
Simply, if a natural condition occurs on publically owned land and is a "but 
for" cause of the plaintiffs injuries, the governmental entity responsible for that land will 
not be liable for any injuries resulting from the natural condition, even if there was 
negligence by the government entity which contributed to the accident. Here, it is beyond 
reason to suggest, and the Grappendorfs do not so suggest, that "but for" the microburst 
gust of wind the injury to Daniel Grappendorf would not have occurred. Even if Pleasant 
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Grove had left what the Grappendorfs claim was a 400 pound pitching mound simply half 
propped against the fence without any chain at all, only a microburst of wind could get 
the pitching mound airborne and lead to the tragic chain of events that did in fact unfold 
in this case. In fact, it is quite possible that a microburst of wind could have even picked 
the pitching mound up from the ground and caused these same injuries to a person even if 
the pitching mound were laying flat on the ground during a baseball game or during 
routine storage.7 
The Grappendorfs also argue in their Appellant Brief that Blackner does not 
apply to this case because "in Blackner the 'natural condition' preceded the governmental 
negligence and was the cause of the plaintiffs injury." Brief of Appellant at page 12. 
The Grappendorfs claim that because their were two avalanches in Blackner, one that 
caused the road blockage and one that hurt Mr. Blackner, the Blackner court must have 
7A microburst of wind is a major natural condition/disaster. The Grappendorfs 
attempt to trivialize the gust of wind which picked up the pitching mound. However, this 
was a major wind event capable of unknown damage and disastrous consequences. See 
[R. at 315, 320]; see e.g., Friends of Gateway v. Slater, 257 F.3d 74, 76 (2nd Cir. 2001) 
(a microburst is a small but powerful rush of cold air that spreads out as it reaches the 
ground and can cause the wind to shift 180 degrees several times within the space of a 
few miles); Fajardo Shopping Center, S.E. v. Sun Alliance Ins. Co. of Puerto, 167 F.3d 1 
at fn 12 (1st Cir. 1999) (microburst winds can generate damaging horizontal winds of up 
to 168 mph); McAleer v. Smith, 860 F.Supp. 924, 941-42 (D. R.L 1994) (a microburst is 
an act of God or a natural disaster similar to a localized hurricane which can produce 
destructive force and extremely unfortunate results); Caldwell v. Let The Good Times Roll 
Festival, 111 So.2d 1263, 1269-72 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (a microburst gust of wind, which 
is a possibility with any storm, is not reasonably foreseeable and is an act of God or force 
majeure sufficient to relieve the city of liability). 
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meant that the first avalanche "and not the government employee - - was the cause of the 
plaintiffs injuries." Brief of Appellant at page 12. This argument misses the mark on a 
number of levels. First, Blackner was an anomaly where there were two separate natural 
conditions, and both avalanches were "but for" causes of Mr. Blackner's harm. "But for" 
the first avalanche Mr. Blackner does not stop and is not hurt. "But for" the negligence of 
the UDOT employees, Mr. Blackner does not get hurt. Also, "but for" the second 
avalanche cascading down the mountain, Mr. Blackner does not get hurt. In Blackner, 
and in this case, the facts clearly evidence that the injuries "arose out o f a natural 
condition. 
It belies logic to accept the Grappendorfs' argument that first a natural 
condition must occur, followed by government negligence in order for the natural 
condition exception to apply. This is not what the Act says, and it is certainly not what 
Blackner stands for. Furthermore, the government's alleged negligence is just simply not 
applicable to decisions of governmental immunity under section 63-30- 10fs waiver 
exceptions. For example, this Court has held that: 
In determining whether an injury falls within this exception to section 
63-30- 10's general waiver of immunity for negligence claims, we have 
rejected attempts to evade the statutory categories by recharacterizing the 
supposed cause of the injury. Instead, we have focused on the conduct or 
situation out of which the injury arose, not on the theory of liability crafted 
by the plaintiff or the type of negligence alleged. 
Tiede, 915 P.2d at 502 (citing cases) (marks omitted); see Taylor on Behalf of Taylor v. 
Ogden City School DisL, 927 P.2d 159, (Utah 1996) (holding that conduct of government 
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employees should "play[] no part in the court's analysis or conclusions that . . . the 
governmental entity was immune from suit."). 
Furthermore, the Grappendorfs present two hypothetical arguments (labeled 
"simple examples") regarding the natural conditions of gravity and predictable wind 
conditions. These arguments are also off the mark. First, the Grappendorfs claim that if a 
Pleasant Grove employee secured the pitching mound above the full bleachers at a 
baseball game with kite string, and the mound naturally broke the string and fell because 
of the natural condition of gravity,8 injuring the spectators, that Pleasant Grove would be 
immune from suit. If this odd scenario were to ever unfold, the employee who placed a 
pitching mound above a spectator seating area would be guilty of malice or malicious 
conduct. In 2002 the Utah Government Immunity Act specifically stated that where an 
employee acted with malice they could be personally liable. See Utah Code Ann. 63-30-
4(4)(a) (2003). This just was not the case here and this "simple example" is wholly 
8In cases like Blackner, Apffel v. Huddleston, 50 F.Supp.2d 1129 (D. Utah 1999) 
(holding that the dangerous condition that resulted in the death of plaintiff was the 
naturally occurring sandstone cliffs, rather than the act of planning a party in their 
vicinity), and this case, the natural conditions are not the types of natural conditions from 
which a government entity could affirmatively protect the public. If government entities 
were forced to engage in protecting the public from natural conditions like avalanches, 
sandstone cliffs, and microburst winds it would result in enormous monetary and social 
cost. When possible, government entities do all they can to protect the public from these 
severe natural conditions. However, the Utah Legislature has recognized that tragic 
circumstances like those in Blackner, Apffel, and this case can happen as a result of 
severe, unpredictable, unexpected, and sometimes unmanageable natural condilions and 
thus, government entities like the City are immune from liability arising from these types 
of natural conditions under the Act. 
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misplaced. 
The Grappendorfs second "simple example" involves negligent renovation 
of a state capital building and misses the mark completely. The natural condition 
exception would not apply at all in that "simple example," because the Act as written in 
2002 specifically states that there is an exception to the waiver of immunity for "a latent 
dangerous or latent defective condition of any public building, structure,... or other 
public improvement." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(17) (2003). 
Simply put, the legislature has determined that certain situations and 
occurrences allow for immunity from suit for government entities even if the alleged 
injuries is proximately caused by the negligent act or omission of a government employee. 
A natural condition is absolutely one of these situations.9 The microburst wind gust on 
June 21, 2002 was a natural condition which was severe enough to pick up, rip from a 
chain, and move what the Grappendorfs claim is an approximately 400 pound pitching 
mound. "But for" the unpredictably severe and unfortunately tragic microburst wind gust 
on June 21, 2002, the Grappendorfs would not have suffered the injury complained of in 
9The Grappendorfs also brought claims for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress against the City. However, the Act states that: "Immunity from suit of all 
governmental entities is waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or 
omission of an employee committed within the scope of employment except if the injury 
arises out of, in connection with, or results from . . . (2). . . infliction of mental anguish . . 
.". Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2)(1997). Accordingly, the City is immune from 
Plaintiffs' claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress under the Act. 
Furthermore, the Grappendorfs did not raise these issues in the Brief of Appellant and 
thus have effectively abandoned these claims on appeal. 
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this lawsuit. The Grappendorfs' alleged injuries and the tragic death of Daniel 
Grappendorf absolutely and unequivocally arose from a natural condition. Thus, the City 
is immune from this lawsuit under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
Accordingly, Judge Taylor was correct in granting Pleasant Grove summary 
judgment pursuant to the natural condition exception to the waiver of government 
immunity in light of the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(11) and the Utah 
Supreme Court's interpretation of the natural condition exception in Blackner v. State, 
Dept. ofTransp., 48 P.3d 949, 2002 UT 44. 
IV. As Applied in this Case the Utah Governmental Immunity Act Does Not 
Violate the Open Courts Clause of the Utah Constitution. 
The Grappendorfs did not make any constitutional arguments in their 
Response in Opposition to Pleasant Grove City's Motion for Summary Judgment.10 See 
10Because the Grappendorfs presented completely new legal theories in their 
supplemental briefing, it was error for the trial court to consider it and this Court should 
not consider the Grappendorfs' Constitutional arguments on de novo review. See [R. at 
1054 (stating that the Supplemental Memorandum "goes far beyond correcting any 
characterization of the law that Pleasant Grove has put forward.")]. As this Court has 
stated: 
While Rule 15(a) U.R.C.P. provides that leave to amend 'shall be freely 
given when justice so requires,' the liberality of the rule is not without limit, 
particularly when nothing new or of substance is contained in the proposed 
amendment. The permitting of amendments to pleadings rests in the sound 
discretion of the trial court and we find no abuse of that discretion in this 
case. Furthermore, an unverified amendment of a pleading should not be 
allowed to defeat a motion for summary judgment if the amendment does 
not effect any substantial change in the issues as they were originally 
formulated in the pleadings. 
Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 351 P.2d 624, 637 (Utah 1960). 
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[R. at 497-518 generally]. Rather, the Grappendorfs waited some two months until the 
eve of the Motion for Summary Judgment hearing before they filed a Motion to Amend 
their Response in Opposition to Defendant Pleasant Grove City's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. See [R. at 881-892]. The trial court granted the Grappendorfs' Motion to 
Amend and treated their pleading, together with the City's Motion to Strike, as 
supplemental briefing. 
The Grappendorfs present two arguments as to why the district court's 
decision violates the Open Courts Clause. First, the Grappendorfs argue that the district 
court "interprets Blackner in a manner that contravenes the Open Courts Clause." Brief 
of Appellant at 16. For the reasons argued in the above section, and those argued in this 
section, this argument is unavailing.11 Contrary to the Grappendorfs claim, the district 
court did not "misuse" Blackner in contravention of the Open Courts Clause, and did not 
expand under any circumstances the application of the natural condition exception. It is 
undisputed that the injury to the Grappendorfs arose out of a natural condition. 
This Court has stated that, "[although the open courts clause protects both 
substantive and procedural rights, the clause is not an absolute guarantee of all 
substantive rights." Tindley v. Salt Lake City School DisL, 116 P.3d 295, 2005 UT 30 at f 
17. The Open Courts Clause "applies only to legislation which "abrogates a cause of 
llThe Grappendorfs settled this lawsuit as to one defendant. That is prima facie 
evidence that the Grappendorfs have not been precluded a remedy in this case in Open 
Court. 
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action existing at the time of its enactment." Id. (citation omitted). "The legislature thus 
remains free to abrogate or limit claims that could not have been brought under 
then-existing law. Claims barred by the doctrine of governmental immunity are an 
example of this principle." Id. 
The Grappendorfs do not argue that at some point in time prior to 2002 they 
could have brought a claim under these facts which has now been abrogated by the 
district courts application of Blackner. Rather, the Grappendorfs rely on their flawed 
logic that because in their eyes Blackner abrogates all claims against government entities 
the application thereof violates the Open Courts Clause. This is not the case. For 
example, if Daniel Grappendorf had climbed under the mound, and it fell on him without 
aid of any natural condition, breaking the strap and killing him, contrary to what the 
Grappendorfs claim, the natural condition exception would not apply simply because 
gravity had made the mound fall. This is because it is common sense that a municipality 
must undertake protecting the public from common concerns and occurrences associated 
with gravity. See e.g., Nelson By and Through Stuckman v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 
573 (Utah 1996) (holding that "once an entity undertakes to provide that protection, it is 
obligated to use reasonable care in providing it."). 
Here, the City had not undertaken to provide protection from microburst 
gusts of wind. See [R. at 1046 (purpose of chaining mound was to protect from jumping 
bikes)]. As is discussed above, a microburst gust of wind can take objects properly 
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secured to avoid the forces of gravity and turn them into lethal projectiles. Accordingly, 
as is thoroughly discussed above, the proximate cause from which this accident "arose out 
o f was the sudden, forceful, and unexpected microburst of wind. Thus, the district court 
correctly applied Blackner and did not abrogate the Grappendorfs of any claim. 
Second, the Grappendorfs claim that the definition of "government 
function" in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4)(a), that was adopted by the Utah Legislature in 
1987 is unconstitutionally overbroad and thus abrogates their right to the Open Courts. 
The Grappendorfs argue that this Court should apply the Berry test found in Berry By and 
Through Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 1X1 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) as that test was 
confirmed in Laney v. Fairview City, 57 P.3d 1007 (Utah 2002). 
This argument places the proverbial cart before the horse. In order for the 
Berry test to apply, the Grappendorfs must prove they were in fact abrogated of a pre-
existing claim for wrongful death against the City. They cannot do so, and thus the Berry 
test is inapplicable. The district court recognized this, when stating "[bjecause there is no 
finding that the legislature impermissibly abrogated a cause of action, this court will not 
apply the Berry test as directed in Laney; the immunity statute must be applied as 
presently in effect." [R. at 1036]. 
Claiming they were in fact abrogated of their Open Courts Clause rights, 
the Grappendorfs now believe that the City's operation of the Manila fields is proprietary, 
and thus was not a government function entitled to immunity. Prior to 1987 proprietary 
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functions were not considered government functions. See Standiford v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980) (holding that proprietary operation of a public golf 
course was not a "governmental function" within purview of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act). This would mean the Grappendorfs would have had a claim against a 
proprietary function prior to 1987. However, after 1987 proprietary functions are 
immune from suit. None of this matters however, as the operation of the Manila Fields is 
not proprietary and would never had fit within the Standiford proprietary context. 
Notwithstanding, the Grappendorfs argue, absent any factual support or 
citation, that the operation of baseball park facility like Manila Field is proprietary like 
the golf course was in Standiford. The Grappendorfs apparently misunderstand that a 
golf course charges those who use it and the Manila Field complex does not. The Manila 
Field complex is not proprietary, and there is nothing in the record that indicates 
otherwise. The Grappendorfs visited the Manila Fields without paying for admission. 
They did not pay to park. It is undisputed that the Manila Fields are absolutely a non-
proprietary public park or public recreational facility. See [R. at 0196 (Grappendorfs 
Second Complaint asserting that City Parks and Recreation employees cared for the 
mound); R. at 514 (Grappendorfs stating mound was "delivered directly to the Pleasant 
Grove City Parks Department.")]. Ironically, in Standiford this Court held that: 
The most general test of governmental function relates to the nature of the 
activity. It must be something done or furnished for the general public good, 
that is, of a "public or governmental character", such as the maintenance 
and operation of public schools, hospitals, public dimities, public parks or 
recreational facilities. 
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Id. at 1231 (emphasis added); see Husband v. Salt Lake City, 92 Utah 449, 69 P.2d 491, 
494 (Utah 1937) (holding that "in the establishment, maintenance, and care of its parks, a 
city acts in its governmental capacity and is not liable for the negligence of its employees 
or agents in connection therewith."); see also [R. at 1038]. 
The operation of the Manila Field is clearly not proprietary. Thus, under no 
circumstances have the Grappendorfs been abrogated of some right to bring a wrongful 
death claim against the City. Accordingly, this Court need not address the Grappendorfs' 
arguments as they pertain to applying the Berry test as it was applied in Laney v. Fairview 
City, 57 P.3d 1007, 2002 UT 79. 
Furthermore, it is doubtful that the Laney decision would even apply to this 
case. For example, Laney holds that given an 1987 amendment to the Act, government 
entities are in fact immune for the negligent acts of all government functions that fit into 
one of the recognized exceptions found in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10. Laney, 2002 UT 
79 at *f 26 (holding "the Act immunizes the City from suit for the negligence alleged by 
plaintiffs."). The Laney Court's majority then goes on hold the following: 
We therefore hold that the 1987 amendment is unconstitutional as it applies 
to municipalities operating electrical power systems. . . . where a high duty 
of care is imposed. We express no opinion on the constitutionality of the 
amendment as applied to other municipal activities since a lower standard 
of care may apply and different considerations may be relevant. 
Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79 at |^ 71 (emphasis added). Time and time again 
throughout the main opinion of Laney, the concurrence, and the dissent, the holding of 
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Laney is specifically limited to only the operation of a municipal power system.12 
In talking about the objective of the Utah Legislature in allowing personal 
injury claims and wrongful death claims against municipalities to expressly be abrogated 
under the Act, the main Court opinion in Laney states "[w]hile that objective is worthy, 
the legislature swept to broadly when it severely curtailed negligence actions against 
municipalities operating power systems." Id. at \ 66. Furthermore, in his concurrence, 
Justice Russon notes that "[t]he operation of a power plant by a government entity is 
proprietary.... I concur that the 1987 amendment is unconstitutional as it applies 
municipalities operating electrical power systems . . . " Id. at f 81-83. 
For four reasons the district court doubted that Laney would apply to this 
case. First, the district court felt that Laney was expressly limited to "municipalities 
operating electrical power systems[.]" [R. at 1043]. Second, Laney's lead opinion was 
only a plurality analysis. Third, "the immunity sought to be retained in Laney was urged 
based on an exception to immunity quite different from the one presently before the court, 
and it is not clear how this court must proceed when, as here, 'a lower standard of care 
12In a 14 page concurrence and dissent by Justice Wilkins, joined by Justice 
Durrant, they state that they would uphold the main opinion's first holding that Fairview 
City is immune from liability. Id. at [^84. However, these Justices expressly disagree with 
the main opinion and the concurrence in holding that any part, however limited, of Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4)(a) is unconstitutional. Id. at % 86 (stating "1 would therefore 
affirm the district court's ruling that Fairview City is immune from suit for the alleged 
negligence."). All of this language shows what a broad misinterpretation of the holding 
and language of Laney plaintiffs present to this Court. 
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may apply and different considerations may be relevant.'" [R. at 1042]. Fourth, 
"decisions subsequent to Laney may indicate that the court does not intend Laney to have 
the sweeping effect Plaintiffs ask for here." [R. at 1041]. 
It is clear that extension of the scope of Laney beyond the operation of 
municipal power plant should never extend to something that was not proprietary in 
nature like the operation and maintenance of a public park and baseball diamond. 
Furthermore, the Grappendorfs have presented no factual evidence in the record which 
indicates that the operation of Manila field was proprietary. For this reason, and those 
stated above, the Grappendorfs cannot prove that they were in fact abrogated of a pre-
existing claim for wrongful death against the City in violation of the Open Courts Clause. 
V. The District Court's Application of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act in 
this Case Does Not Violate the Wrongful Death Cause of Action Guarantee of 
the Utah Constitution. 
Initially, the Grappendorfs did not properly and fully present this argument 
at the trial court. Notwithstanding, Judge Taylor indicated that Article XVI § 5 "is part of 
the article on 'Labor.'" [R. at 1045 (footnote 26 of the Memorandum Decision)]. The 
trial court also noted that "[n]o party has cited any cases demonstrating that this section 
applies in the present action. As such, this decision addresses only Article I § 11." Id. 
The Grappendorfs made no constitutional arguments at all in their Response in 
Opposition to Defendant Pleasant Grove City's Motion for Summary Judgment. See [R. 
at 497-518 generally]. The Grappendorfs do briefly address Article XVI § 5 in their 
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Supplemental Memorandum. See [R. at 881-892]. In their Brief of Appellant, the 
Grappendorfs do present a lengthy discussion of the history of Utah law and wrongful 
death claims. The Grappendorfs fail to recognize that here, their wrongful death claim is 
against a government entity. Thus, case law or statutory law which does not fall within 
this exact same framework is unpersuasive. Despite their historical analysis, the 
Grappendorfs cite no Utah statute indicating how Article XVI § 5 specifically applies to 
wrongful death claims against government entities.13 
Essentially, the Grappendorfs argue only that similar to their unpersuasive 
arguments made regarding the Open Courts Clause, their claims against Pleasant Grove 
has been abrogated by the application of the Utah Government Immunity Act. However, 
this Court has expressly held that this argument is unpersuasive. Tiede v. State of Utah, 
915 P.2d 500 (Utah 1996). 
In Tiede, two felons walked away from a state halfway house, holed up for 
a week in a cabin, and then made a call to another inmate and informed they would kill 
the cabin's owners when they arrived. Id. at 501. The inmate the felons called told state 
officials about this call but the state failed to respond to the information. Id. As 
13The Grappendorfs claim that a statute did create a cause of action for wrongful 
death prior to the enactment of the Utah Constitution. Brief of Appellant at page 20. 
However, that statute expressly limits those who may be liable to a person, a company, or 
a corporation. Id. This statute does not create a cause of action in wrongful death against 
a government entity. See id. The "every such case" language emphasized by the 
Grappendorfs is limited to only a liable person, company, or corporation. Id. The statute, 
from 1874, has no applicability to this case. 
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represented, the two felons killed the cabins homeowners and kidnaped their kids. Id. 
The heirs of the deceased and the kids brought a civil action "alleging that the State was 
negligent in failing to apprehend [the felons] and in failing to protect their family 
members from the inmates. The action further alleges that the State proximately caused 
the injuries and the two deaths. The district court dismissed the complaint against the 
State on the basis of governmental immunity." Id. at 501-02. 
As was discussed previously, in Tiede, this Court analyzed section 63-30-10 
exceptions to waivers of immunity and found that the district court correctly determined 
that the state was immune from suit. Id. at 502. In analyzing the wrongful death aspects 
of the Tiede case, this Court held that: 
Wrongful death is a civil claim created by statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 
78-11-7. Nevertheless, its express mention in section 63-30-10[] is 
unnecessary because, as we have observed, this section already immunizes a 
governmental entity if a death arises out of [the conduct or condition listed 
in the section 63-30-10 exceptions]. 
Id. at 503. The plaintiffs in Tiede also claimed that this application of the Act abrogated 
their constitutional right under Article XVI § 5 of the Utah Constitution. 
In analyzing whether this right was abrogated, the Utah Supreme Court held 
that "the scope of protection afforded by the wrongful death provision is limited to rights 
of action that existed at the time the provision was adopted." Id. at 504. "Sovereign 
immunity was a settled feature of the common law when Utah became a state and adopted 
its constitution." Id. "At the time the constitution was adopted in 1895, there was no 
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express constitutional or statutory authority allowing suits for wrongful death against the 
State." Id. "In sum, by retaining governmental immunity from wrongful death suits 
against the State, section 63-30-10[] does not abrogate any previously existing right of 
action and therefore does not violate article XVI, section 5." Id. Sovereign immunity and 
governmental immunity both apply to the City. The Grappendorfs do not cite one case 
that states otherwise. See Brief of Appellant, generally. Nor do they cite one case that 
indicates that they had a prior right to assert claim for wrongful death against a 
government entity. See id. 
The Grappendorfs claim that the Tiede decision was incorrect and that this 
Court as currently situated should overrule Tiede. Brief of Appellant at page 19. This 
argument is unavailing as Tiede was correctly decided and is very sound law. This 
Court's opinion in Tiede has been relied on by this Court since it was decided for the 
express holding that immunity exists for a government entity against a claim for wrongful 
death, and that this application of the Act does not violate Article XVI § 5 of the Utah 
Constitution. See Tindley v. Salt Lake City School Dist., 116 P.3d 295, 305, 2005 UT 30 
at ^ 36 (recognizing Tiede in holding that the Act does not abrogate any previously 
existing right of action and therefore does not violate article XVI, section 5); Parks v. 
Utah Transit Authority, 53 P.3d 473, 477, 2002 UT 55 % 15 (citing Tiede for "observing 
that when the state constitution was adopted, there was no express constitutional or 
statutory authority allowing suits for wrongful death against the State."). It is clear that 
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Tiede was correctly decided and that the Grappendorfs have not suffered a violation of 
Article XVI § 5 of the Utah Constitution as a result of the trial court's application of the 
natural condition exception to the waiver of government immunity to their claim of 
wrongful death. 
VI. Judge Taylor's Application of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act in this 
Case Does Not Violate the Petition Clause of the Utah Constitution. 
The Grappendorfs argue on appeal that the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act, as applied, violated their Petition rights under the Utah Constitution. See Brief of 
Appellant at pages 4, 23-24. Initially, this argument was not made in pleading format to 
the trial court. See [R. 0881-0892]. The Grappendorfs did however raise this issue at oral 
argument on the City's Motion for Summary Judgment. See [R. 1150 at secondary pages 
13 and 29]. Notwithstanding, this argument is misplaced. 
As stated in the Appellant's Brief, the Petition Clause of the Utah 
Constitution assures that "[a] 11 men have the inherent and inalienable right to . . . petition 
for redress of grievances " Brief of Appellant at page 23 (citing Utah Const. Art. I, § 
1). Appellants' Brief admits that a petition is a formal written request to a court, or in 
other words, a Complaint. See id. In the Grappendorfs own words the Petition Clause 
assures that all citizens of Utah are allowed to file a complaint in the court system. See 
id. The Grappendorfs cite to two cases for support, but these cases both indicate that the 
filing of a complaint essentially satisfies the Petition Clause. See Kish v. Wright, 562 
P.2d 625 (Utah 1977) (holding that "civil rights actions arising under Sec. 1983 of the 
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United States Code can be properly brought within the jurisdiction of this state."). In 
other words the Kish court only held that a state court must entertain jurisdiction over a 
section 1983 civil rights case if such a complaint is filed in state court. Id. 
Furthermore, the Grappendorfs admit that in the case of In re Anderson, 82 
P.3d 1134, 2004 UT 7 \ 68 (Utah 2004), this Court stated that filing a civil complaint was 
tantamount to exercising ones right to petition for the redress of grievances. Here, it is 
undisputed that the Grappendorfs were allowed to file their civil complaint. Thus, the 
Grappendorfs did petition the trial court to redress their grievances. The trial court 
indicated at oral argument that the Grappendorfs had been allowed to petition for their 
grievances when it said the Petition Clause guarantees only that: "you can sue everybody" 
and "[tjhat's why I come to work everyday." [R. 1150 at pages 13 and 29]. In other 
words, filing your complaint and getting your claim properly before the court satisfies the 
Petition Clause. The Petition Clause does not guarantee a right to an absolute outcome. 
The Grappendorfs have brought their claims against Pleasant Grove and 
other defendants who have now been dismissed with prejudice. The district court has 
ruled on those claims or they have been settled and those defendants dismissed with 
prejudice. See Brief of Appellant at page 6-8. The Petition Clause goes no further than to 
say that all persons have the right to petition the court to redress their grievances, which 
in this case the Plaintiffs have clearly done. Accordingly, their was no violation of the 
Petition Clause in this case under any scenario. 
-34-
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the City respectfully requests that this Court 
affirm Judge Taylor's grant of governmental immunity to Pleasant Grove in this case. 
DATED this ft? day of October, 2006. 
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES 
PETER STIRBA 
MEB W. ANDERSON 
Attorneys for Pleasant Grove City 
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